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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4161 
 ___________ 
 
 RAY MCFADDEN, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 09-4897) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 10, 2011 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: June 20, 2011 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Ray McFadden appeals the District Court‟s order dismissing his 
amended complaint.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise de novo 
review over the District Court‟s order.  Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 808 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the District Court‟s 
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judgment.  
 This action arises out of an incident that occurred on August 6, 1997, when 
McFadden was working as a physician at a Veterans Affairs hospital in South Dakota.  
On that day, one of McFadden‟s patients, Robert YellowBird, died while under 
McFadden‟s care.  According to McFadden, the official cause of death was related to 
YellowBird‟s asthma.   
 In his initial complaint, McFadden alleged that, at the time he was treating 
Yellowbird, he had not eaten in 24 hours.  To relieve his hunger, a nurse gave him a dish 
of peach strudel that had been served to, but not eaten by, McFadden.  McFadden 
subsequently became disoriented and light headed, lost track of time, and had difficulty 
functioning appropriately.  Eventually, he became unable to move.  McFadden thus 
claimed that he “and [YellowBird] may have been poisoned by eating the food.”  He 
sought five million dollars from the United States. 
 The United States filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that 
McFadden‟s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the discretionary-
function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2680, among 
other things.  The District Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice.  The Court 
noted that it had attempted to construe the complaint liberally, but found that it was 
“exceedingly difficult to understand and [did] not appear to include any intelligible claim 
for relief.”  Nevertheless, the Court invited McFadden to file an amended complaint. 
 McFadden availed himself of the opportunity to amend.  In his amended 
complaint, his allegations again centered on the death of YellowBird.  He claimed that he 
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had considered other possible causes of YellowBird‟s death, one of which “may have 
been respiratory arrest from a neuromuscular toxin.”  If that was YellowBird‟s cause of 
death, McFadden continued, “YellowBird may have died as a result of ingesting an oral 
agent.  If that were in fact true, then Plaintiff Ray McFadden may have also been 
poisoned since he was given food from Veteran YellowBird‟s tray of food.”  McFadden 
attributed the ailments that he suffered on the date of YellowBird‟s death to lack of food 
and sleep; as a result of being poisoned, he suffered “latent medical problems” that 
manifested years later.  
 The District Court again dismissed the complaint, this time with prejudice.  The 
Court interpreted the complaint to allege a claim for personal injury under the FTCA.  
The FTCA provides that a plaintiff must present any claim to the appropriate federal 
agency “within two years after such claim accrues.”  28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).  The Court 
concluded that the alleged poisoning occurred on August 6, 1997, and that because 
McFadden had suffered severe and multiple symptoms that very night, he was 
immediately on notice that he had been injured.  However, he did not file his 
administrative action until 2006.  Accordingly, the Court held that the claim was time-
barred.  The Court further declined to exercise jurisdiction over any state-law claims that 
McFadden had attempted to assert.  McFadden then filed a timely notice of appeal.   
On appeal, McFadden claims that the District Court misconstrued his claim.  He 
argues that the injuries he suffered in August 1997 were unrelated to the alleged 
poisoning; they stemmed wholly from his lack of food and sleep.  His injuries from the 
poisoning did not surface until much later, and he thus had no basis to know that he had 
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been harmed until that time.  While it is true that we have applied the discovery rule in 
latent-disease cases, see, e.g., Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 117, 129 (3d Cir. 2003), 
we need not resolve the timing issue here, because the record reveals an alternative basis 
for the District Court‟s judgment, see Erie Telecomms. v. Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 (3d 
Cir. 1988).  As the government argued in its motion to dismiss, McFadden has failed to 
state a claim on which relief can be granted.   
 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “„state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  A claim is facially plausible when “the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id.   Allegations that are “merely 
consistent with a defendant‟s liability” or show the “mere possibility of misconduct” will 
not suffice.  Id. at 1949-50 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, McFadden‟s allegations are entirely speculative.  His claim is built on his 
“educated guess” that YellowBird may have been poisoned.  He then stacks further 
suppositions on this shaky foundation:  that YellowBird may have ingested this poison 
orally; that this poison may have been placed in the strudel that McFadden ate (after 
YellowBird left it untouched, suggesting that the poison was spread among several 
dishes); and that this poison may have caused McFadden to develop medical problems 
years later (while acting immediately upon YellowBird).  Moreover, although McFadden 
sues the United States, he presents no allegations whatsoever indicating that it was 
involved in the alleged poisoning.  These allegations fail to show that McFadden 
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possesses a plausible claim for relief.  See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“[W]here the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 
misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not shown — that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.” (internal quotation marks, alteration omitted)); see also Santiago v. 
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 133 (3d Cir. 2010).
1
  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‟s order dismissing McFadden‟s 
amended complaint.    
                                                 
1
  It is unclear whether McFadden has attempted to raise any claims arising under 
state law.  To the extent that he has, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.  See Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 939 
(3d Cir. 1996).   
